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Energy efﬁciency as an instrument of regional development
policy? The impact of regional ﬁscal autonomy
Gioele Figusa , Patrizio Leccab , Peter McGregorc and Karen Turnerd
ABSTRACT
This paper analyses the system-wide impact of increased household energy efﬁciency in a regional context, using Scotland
as an example. It shows that household energy efﬁciency improvements typically deliver a ‘double dividend’ of a regional
economic stimulus and reduction in energy use. However, the trade-off between the two is sensitive to the degree of
regional ﬁscal autonomy, and so is likely to vary across regions. The use of taxation to support the implementation of
energy-efﬁciency improvement programmes negatively impacts competitiveness, unless workers are willing to accept
lower after-tax wages to fund public spending on improving household energy efﬁciency.
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INTRODUCTION
Many regional governments have ambitious plans for
household energy efﬁciency (e.g., the Energy Efﬁcient
Scotland policy programme, labelled Scotland’s Energy
Efﬁciency Programme (SEEP) at the time of the research;
Scottish Government, 2017). However, while traditionally
improvements in energy efﬁciency have been proposed as
climate tools to reduce energy use and associated emissions,
there is a recent tendency to consider energy efﬁciency as a
means of stimulating economic development.1 The aim of
this paper is to analyse the economy-wide impacts of
increasing household energy efﬁciency in a regional context,
accounting both for ‘costs’, particularly in terms of rebound
in energy use2 and for the potential beneﬁts of energy efﬁ-
ciency. The Scottish government, and many other regional
and local governments, has multiple policy objectives,
including sustainable economic growth, which itself reﬂects
a positive weighting on both greater economic activity and
lower carbon emissions. Accordingly, when assessing the
impact of policies, including those relating to energy
efﬁciency, it is appropriate to reﬂect these wider objectives.
The focus should, therefore, not be exclusively on the
impact on energy use. Indeed, we explore the potential of
household energy-efﬁciency improvements to be effective
instruments of regional development policy, as well as con-
tributing to limiting carbon emissions.3
We analyse the impact of increases in regional house-
hold energy efﬁciency using our computable general equili-
brium (CGE) model of Scotland. This is a purpose-built,
energy-economy-environment model of Scotland that
tracks the effects of policies on a range of non-energy as
well as energy policy goals. In particular, it allows an assess-
ment of the impact on economic development. The
regional context is critical for the analysis. First, the
model is calibrated to a social accounting matrix for Scot-
land, and so embodies the importance of interregional
and international trade ﬂows to a small, open region.
Second, we reﬂect the openness of regional labour markets
through the inﬂuence of migration ﬂows. Third, we capture
alternative degrees of regional ﬁscal autonomy to reﬂect the
asymmetric nature of devolution among UK regions, so
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that the relevance of the analysis is not restricted to Scot-
land. Fourth, we recognize the potential regional differen-
tiation of attitudes towards ‘green’ taxation and public
spending, and assess their signiﬁcance for the success of
regional policies aimed at enhancing household energy
efﬁciency.
We ﬁnd that energy-efﬁciency improvements typically
yield a ‘double dividend’4 of increased regional economic
activity and reduced energy use, although the trade-off
between the two is sensitive to the degree of regional ﬁscal
autonomy. Furthermore, the economic development effects
of energy-efﬁciency changes are permanent, unlike the
effects of any transitory increase in spending or taxation
that may accompany the implementation of energy efﬁ-
ciency changes.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section
reviews the literature. The third section describes the
CGE model used for the analysis. The fourth section dis-
cusses the simulation scenarios. The ﬁfth section considers
the impact of a government expenditure-funded increase in
household energy efﬁciency. Here we consider two cases.
First, a block-grant ﬁscal arrangement under which the
budget constraint of any devolved government does not
vary with regional economic activity. This effectively
characterizes the current position of UK regions other
than Scotland. Second, we explore the impact of an expen-
diture-ﬁnanced increase in household energy efﬁciency in
the presence of a signiﬁcant degree of ﬁscal autonomy.
This is consistent with the new ﬁscal arrangements being
implemented for Scotland (and planned for Wales and
Northern Ireland).5 The sixth section uses SEEP as an
example to assess the impact of a potentially tax-funded
increase in household energy efﬁciency. Here we consider
how regions with different environmental attitudes may
react to the introduction of a temporary tax to fund
energy-efﬁciency programmes. The seventh section dis-
cusses the results and concludes.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Using CGE frameworks, studies focused on assessing
rebound from energy-efﬁciency increases in production
have already underlined how a more efﬁcient use of energy
can deliver signiﬁcant economic beneﬁts. For example,
Allan, Hanley, McGregor, Swales, and Turner (2007),
Broberg, Berg, and Samakovlis (2015), Grepperud and
Rasmussen (2004), Glomsrød and Wei (2005), Hanley,
McGregor, Swales, and Turner (2009), Turner (2009)
and Yu, Moreno-Cruz, and Crittenden (2015) ﬁnd that
improving energy efﬁciency in production leads to a pro-
ductivity-led expansion. The ﬁndings are quite intui-
tive because in these studies energy is one of the
production inputs along with capital, labour and materials.
However, CGE studies focused on the economy-wide
effects of increased household energy efﬁciency ﬁnd that
energy-efﬁciency increases in household consumption can
also stimulate the macro-economy (e.g., Duarte, Feng,
Sanchez-Choliz, Sarasa, & Sun, 2015; Dufournaud,
Quinn, & Harrington, 1994; Figus, Turner, McGregor,
& Katris, 2017; Lecca, McGregor, Swales, & Turner,
2014). Duarte et al. (2015) investigate different energy-
savings policies, including increased energy-efﬁciency
improvements, in Spain. However, that study is quite
speciﬁc to the Spanish economy characterized by very
different energy needs compared with Scotland and focuses
mostly on the effectiveness of energy-saving policies on
CO2 emissions.
Lecca, McGregor et al. (2014) studies the economic
impact of an across-the-board 5% improvement in the
energy efﬁciency of a UK household. They consider an efﬁ-
ciency improvement to reﬂect an increase in the value of
energy expressed in efﬁciency units, meaning that house-
holds can consume the original ‘pre-efﬁciency’ bundle of
goods (energy and non-energy) but using less physical
energy. This stimulates the wider economy through an
increase in aggregate demand because households respond
to the lower energy price by consuming more energy in
efﬁciency units, but also increasing their non-energy con-
sumption.6However, while in studies focused on industrial
energy use, such as Allan et al. (2007) and Turner (2009),
the economic expansion is driven by an increase in compe-
titiveness, in Lecca, McGregor et al. (2014) the demand-
led growth puts upward pressure on consumption prices
and so decreases competitiveness, partially crowding out
exports.7
Our own regional CGE initially builds on the national
case in Lecca, McGregor et al. (2014). In this respect, we
provide some comparable simulations to allow a focus to
be made on differences between the regional and national
cases, reﬂecting differences in the degree of openness of
goods and labour markets in the regional case. However,
the primary objective is to compare the impact of house-
hold-efﬁciency changes under alternative degrees of regional
ﬁscal autonomy. On this basis, we contrast the energy sav-
ings–economy trade-off for expenditure-ﬁnanced increases
in household energy efﬁciency under varying degrees of ﬁscal
autonomy. We also consider the broad nature of pro-
grammes under the SEEP as an illustrative case study of a
regional household energy-efﬁciency initiative. Finally, we
assess the likely impact of a tax-ﬁnanced increase in house-
hold energy efﬁciency, a policy action that becomes feasible
under regional ﬁscal autonomy.
THE CGE MODEL
We use the AMOS ENVI CGE model for Scotland.8 The
regional focus of AMOS ENVI is reﬂected in two main
characteristics. First, it allows for ﬂow migration to reﬂect
the free circulation of workers within the UK territory.9
Second, it considers that regional government expenditure
depends on a system of block-grant transfers from the
national government, and it is therefore ﬁxed. This
assumption is relaxed further below to assess the impact
of ﬁscal autonomy.
Consumption
Consumption is modelled to reﬂect the behaviour of a
representative household that maximizes its discounted
2 Gioele Figus et al.
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intertemporal utility, subject to a lifetime wealth constraint.
The solution of the household optimization problem gives
the optimal time path for consumption of the bundle of
goods Ct.
Within each period consumption, Ct, is allocated
between energy goods EC and non-energy goods NEC
so that:
Ct = [d
E(gECt)
(1−1/1)
+ (1− dE)NEC (1−1/1)t ]
(−1/1−1)
(1)
where ε is the elasticity of substitution in consumption. It
measures the ease with which consumers can substitute
energy goods for non-energy goods and is based on the
most recent econometric estimation carried out by Lecca,
McGregor et al. (2014), taking the value of 0.35 for the
short run and 0.61 for the long run.10 δ ∈ (0,1) is the
share parameter; and γ is the efﬁciency parameter of energy
consumption. Energy consumption includes electricity,
gas, oil and coal. We assume that the individual can con-
sume goods produced both domestically and imported,
where imports are combined with domestic goods under
the Armington assumption of imperfect substitution
(Armington, 1969).
Production and investment
The production structure is represented by a nested con-
stant elasticity of substitution (CES) production function
where capital and labour are combined to form value
added, and energy and materials are combined into inter-
mediate inputs. The combination of intermediate inputs
and value added forms gross output. Domestic and
imported goods are combined under the Armington
assumption (Armington, 1969).11
The demand functions for capital and labour are
obtained from the ﬁrst-order conditions of the CES pro-
duction function. Following Hayashi (1982), the optimal
time path of investment is derived from maximizing the
value of ﬁrms, Vt, subject to a capital accumulation function
K˙ t , so that:
Max Vt
∑1
t=0
1
1+ r
( )t
[pt − It(1+ g(xt))]
subject to K˙ t = It − dKt
(2)
where pit is the ﬁrm’s proﬁt; It is private investment; r is a
discount factor; g(xt) is the adjustment cost function,
with xt ¼ It/Kt; and δ is depreciation rate. The solution
of the problem gives the law of motion of the shadow
price of capital, λt, and the adjusted Tobin’s q time path
of investment (Hayashi, 1982).
The labour market, wage bargaining and
migration
Wages are determined within the region in an imperfect
competition setting, according to the following wage curve:
ln
wbt
cpit
[ ]
= w− e ln (ut) (3)
where:
wbt =
wt
1+ tt
where the bargaining power of workers and, hence, the real
consumption wage is negatively related to the rate of unem-
ployment (Blanchﬂower & Oswald, 2009). In equation (3),
(wbt/cpit) is the real after-tax consumption wage; w is a par-
ameter calibrated to the steady state; ɛ is the elasticity of the
wage rate with respect to the rate of unemployment, u, and
it takes the value of 0.113 (Layard, Nickell, & Jackman,
1991); and tt is the income tax rate which is ﬁxed in the
default setting.
Since regions are much more open systems than
nations, the assumption of a ﬁxed working population, as
used in national CGE modelling analysis, such as by
Lecca, McGregor et al. (2014), is inappropriate in a
regional context. For this reason, we introduce the follow-
ing migration function:
nimt = 6− v
u[ ln (ut)− ln (u
N )]+ vw[ln(wbt/cpit)
− (wN /cpi
N
)] (4)
where nimt is the instantaneous rate of net migration; ζ is a
parameter calibrated to ensure zero migration in the ﬁrst
period; and vu and vw are elasticities that measure the
response to the differences in logs between regional and
national unemployment and real wage rates and are equal
to 0.06 and 0.08 respectively (Layard et al., 1991). In
equation (4), net migration ﬂows are positively related to
the difference between the log of regional and national
real wages and negatively related to the difference between
the log of regional and national unemployment rates
(Layard et al., 1991).
The social wage
We explore a special case where workers reﬂect the amenity
value of public expenditure in the wage-bargaining process.
We call this the social wage. This is implemented by aug-
menting equation (3) so that:
ln
wbt
cpit
[ ]
= w− e ln (ut)+ abln(1− tt) (3a)
where a [ (0, 1) represents the extent to which public
consumption is reﬂected in the wage determination; and
b [ (0, 1) is the relative valuation of public goods.
Accordingly, equation (4) is augmented as follows:
nimt = 6− v
u[ ln (ut)− ln (u
N )]+ vw[ln(wbt/cpit)
− bln(1− tt)− (w
N /cpi
N
)] (4a)
When a ¼ 0 and b ¼ 0, workers and migrants do not value
any increase in government expenditure and expressions
(3a) and (4a) reduce to their standard forms in (3) and
(4). When the two parameters equal 1, wage bargaining
and gross migration respond to the gross of tax wage
(Lecca, McGregor, Swales, & Yin, 2014). Essentially this
reﬂects a situation where workers attribute the same
value, at the margin, to the consumption of public and
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private goods. This implies that the amenity value of gov-
ernment expenditure is independent of its composition.
However, in the present context, it is as if workers and
migrants within the region are sufﬁciently concerned
about the environment that they are willing to accept a
reduced take-home pay in exchange for a government-
funded increase in household energy efﬁciency.
The government
The government operates according to the following bud-
get constraint where the ﬁscal deﬁcit (FD) is given by gov-
ernment income (GY) minus expenditure (GEXP):
FDt = GYt −GEXPt
where:
GYt = d
g
·
∑
i
rki,t · Ki,t
(
+
∑
i
IBTi,t + tt ·
∑
j
L j,t ·wt + FE · 1t
)
(5)
GEXPt =
∑
i
Gi,t · Pgt +
∑
dngins
TRGdngins,t · Pct
where GY is the sum of the share dg of capital revenue that is
transferred to the government; IBT is indirect business taxes;
L is revenues from labour income at a rate of t;12 and FE is
foreign remittances times the ﬁxed exchange rate ε. GEXP
includes government spending on goods and services G
plus transfers (TRG) to other non-governmental domestic
institutions (dngins), which are ﬁxed in real terms.
Data and calibration
The structural parameters of the model are derived from
the 2009 Social Accounting Matrix (SAM)13 for Scotland
(Emonts-Holley & Ross, 2014), which incorporates the
2009 Scottish Input–Output tables. The Scottish SAM
reports information about economic transactions between
industries and other aggregate economic agents, namely
the Scottish household, the Scottish government and cor-
porate sectors, and accounts for imports and exports to
the rest of the UK (RUK) and the rest of the world
(ROW). For this paper, we aggregate the SAM to 21
industries,14 including four energy sectors, gas, electricity,
coal and reﬁned oil. Other parameters required to inform
the model, such as elasticities and share parameters, are
either exogenously imposed, based on econometric esti-
mation or best guesses, or calibrated.
We calibrate the model to be initially in steady-state
equilibrium (Adams & Higgs, 1990). Following any dis-
turbance, the model solves a sufﬁciently long number of
periods (years) to allow the economy to reach a new
steady-state equilibrium. Results are reported for two con-
ceptual periods: the short run (SR), where population and
capital stocks are ﬁxed; and the long run (LR), which cor-
responds to the new steady-state equilibrium characterized
by no further changes in sectoral capital stocks and popu-
lation. We also report period-by-period adjustments.
SIMULATION SCENARIOS
The simulations reﬂect two main scenarios. First, in the
absence of speciﬁc information on the scale of efﬁciency
stimuli attributable to regional initiatives such as SEEP,
we simulate an illustrative 5% increase in household energy
efﬁciency.15 The simulations are carried out assuming a
block-grant regional ﬁscal regime. Here the only way of
funding an increase in household energy efﬁciency within
the region through increased government expenditure is
to switch public spending from other uses. In general, the
composition of these changes in public spending will differ
and this may impact the macro-economy. However, for
simplicity, and in absence of better information, here we
adopt the assumption that the reallocation of public spend-
ing has no effect on aggregate demand;16 not only is the
total of public spending unchanged but also its macroeco-
nomic impact.17 Any such impact would in any case be
purely transitory since funding simply applies to the
implementation phase (e.g., installing insulation). How-
ever, the associated efﬁciency gain is effectively permanent
(over the lifetime of the accommodation).
We then consider the same public expenditure-ﬁnanced
increase in household energy efﬁciency, i.e., the 5% stimulus,
and assess the impact of greater regional ﬁscal autonomy on
the improvements in both energy use and the economy.
Here we investigate the cases where recycled tax revenues
are used either to increase government spending or to reduce
the income tax rate.
Second, we consider SEEP as an example of a govern-
ment-funded energy-efﬁciency programme,18 but assume
that the spending necessary to implement the programme
is additional to the current level of government spending.
This option is only available to regional governments
with devolved ﬁscal powers. While we know the public
expenditure associated with SEEP, as yet there is little evi-
dence about the success of pilot projects and the likely scale
of the stimulus to energy efﬁciency. Accordingly, we ﬁrst
assess the increase in efﬁciency that would have to be
secured to render the programme self-funding (in present
value terms).19
Using this result, we explore the impact of a tax-
ﬁnanced SEEP-like project since such ﬁnancing becomes
feasible under ﬁscal autonomy. This raises additional com-
plications, notably the adverse supply-side impacts of a rise
in the income tax rate. These could, however, be partially or
even wholly offset if Scottish taxpayers’ preference for
‘green’ policies leads them to accept a loss in take-home
pay, given their perception of the wider beneﬁts of an
improvement in household energy efﬁciency.
IMPACT OF AN ILLUSTRATIVE 5%
EXPENDITURE-FINANCED INCREASE IN
HOUSEHOLD ENERGY EFFICIENCY
The block-grant ﬁscal regime
This section presents simulation results for an illustrative
5% increase in household energy efﬁciency funded by a
4 Gioele Figus et al.
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reallocation of government spending. Recall that we
assume that the temporary rise in government expenditure
necessary to fund the efﬁciency improvement is compen-
sated by a reduction in expenditure elsewhere and that
this switch has no effect on aggregate demand. This implies
that total government expenditure remains unchanged, as
shown in Table 1. Variations in tax revenues accrue to
Westminster.
Table 1 summarizes SR and LR results of simulations.
Following the energy-efﬁciency improvement, household
energy consumption decreases by 2.70%, while household
consumption increases by 0.30%. The higher consumption
puts upward pressure on the consumer price index (CPI),
making domestic products more expensive and reducing
international competitiveness. On the other hand, this
shift in demand stimulates non-energy sectors, so that
total investment increases by 0.15% and the output of
non-energy producers rises by 0.07%. This impacts the
labour market, where total employment increases by
0.06%, unemployment rate decreases by 0.24% and the
real wage is 0.03% higher.
The initial drop in the unemployment rate and rise in
the real wage triggers net in-migration of workers from
the rest of the UK. This puts downward pressure on
wages, and increases the unemployment rate according to
the wage setting curve (equation 3). This can be seen in
Figure 1 where we plot the time paths of the nominal
wage, unemployment, CPI and exports. The real wage
falls and the unemployment rate increases until they both
approach their baseline levels, as the labour market reaches
its LR equilibrium. Similarly, the CPI returns to its base-
year value, allowing exports to increase again until original
competitiveness is completely restored.20 This is a crucial
result. It shows that, in a regional economy with free move-
ment of workers and ﬂow migration, the negative effect on
competitiveness implied by the constraint on labour supply
disappears in the LR.
Restored LR competitiveness contributes additional
momentum to the economic stimulus. In the LR, gross
domestic product (GDP) increases by 0.17%,21 and the
output of non-energy sectors is 0.19% higher. However,
because these activities use energy as an input in pro-
duction, industrial energy use falls by 0.24% mostly due
to the 1.47% reduction in household energy demand and
consequent contraction in energy-supplying sectors.22
The zero variation in prices over the LR indicates the
presence of a pure demand response to the introduction
of the energy-efﬁciency improvement, similar to what we
would expect in an input–output modelling framework
(McGregor, Swales, & Yin, 1996).23 The economic expan-
sion observed in this scenario is entirely demand driven. It
is important to note that the increase in household energy
efﬁciency generates a double dividend of reduced energy
use and increased economic activity.
The ﬁscal autonomy regime
Under ﬁscal autonomy, tax revenues accrue to the regional
government. This is already true for income taxes in Scot-
land and will shortly be true for Wales and, for corporation
tax, Northern Ireland. Other regional economies of the UK
remain subject to a strict budget constraint as in the block-
grant regional ﬁscal regime considered in the previous sec-
tion. We illustrate the key principles by focusing on the
simple case where the regional government maintains a
ﬁxed deﬁcit according to equation (5).
To illustrate the implications of this assumption, we
repeat the simulations of scenario 1, which reﬂects a 5%
increase in households’ energy efﬁciency in the presence
of endogenous migration.24
We explore three sub-scenarios, FIXGOV, FIX-
BAL and TAX. The FIXGOV scenario replicates the
results of scenario 1 by assuming ﬁxed government expen-
diture with tax revenues accruing to Westminster. In the
FIXBAL case, we assume that tax revenues are devolved
and the Scottish government maintains a given ﬁscal deﬁcit
by varying public expenditure in response to any changes in
tax revenues. In the TAX scenario, we assume that any
Table 1. Impact of a 5% increase in household energy
efﬁciency.
Time period
Short
run (SR)
Long
run (LR)
Gross domestic product (GDP) 0.04 0.17
Consumer price index (CPI) 0.08 0.00
Unemployment rate –0.24 0.00
Total employment 0.06 0.18
Nominal gross wage 0.11 0.00
Real gross wage 0.03 0.00
Households consumption 0.30 0.42
Investment 0.15 0.17
Export –0.12 0.00
Non-energy output 0.07 0.19
Energy output –0.41 –0.41
Energy use –0.89 –0.57
Energy demand by industries –0.22 –0.24
Household energy consumption –2.70 –1.47
Household consumption of non-energy 0.49 0.54
Government expenditure – –
Fiscal deﬁcit –53.66 –165.48
Economy-wide rebound 27.65 53.48
Note: Values are the percentage change from baseline values.
Figure 1. Period-by-period adjustment of the consumer price
index (CPI), unemployment rate, nominal wage and exports.
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stimulus to the economy, and to tax revenues, is used to
reduce the income tax rate so as to maintain a ﬁxed ﬁscal
balance.
FIXGOV results are reported in the ﬁrst column of
Table 2. The economic stimulus from the improved house-
hold energy efﬁciency generates additional tax revenues.
The Scottish government’s ‘notional’ ﬁscal deﬁcit improves
in both the SR and LR, but this simply results in increased
transfers to Westminster.25
In the FIXBAL case, the additional income is used to
increase the Scottish government’s current expenditure by
0.06% in the SR and 0.24% in the LR. The additional
resources recycled within Scotland in the form of additional
public spending further stimulate the economy. For this
reason, GDP increases by more than in the FIXGOV
case in both the SR (by 0.05%) and the LR (by 0.26%).
Similarly, we observe a greater increase in industries’
employment, investment and output. However, the greater
economic expansion is also associated with a smaller
reduction in energy use.
Finally, in the TAX case, the results of which are
reported in the third major column of Table 2, the govern-
ment uses the additional resources to reduce the income tax
rate. In this case, we have a simultaneous demand-and-
supply stimulus.
First, a tax reduction increases households’ disposable
income so that consumption rises by 0.40% in the SR and
0.66% in the LR. Second, the reduced taxation increases
the post-tax real consumption wage. This puts downward
pressure on wage bargaining, reducing the price of labour
and stimulating employment and production. The lower
labour cost improves competitiveness so, in contrast to the
other cases, export demand increases in the LR.
Because production is stimulated by the lower price of
labour, industries produce more output, increasing the
use of other inputs, including energy. For this reason, the
reduction in total energy use is substantially lower than in
the FIXGOV case, especially in the LR (0.36% as against
0.57%). However, in all these cases, we still observe a
‘double dividend’, but the bigger the stimulus to the econ-
omy, the smaller the reduction in energy use.
IMPACT OF TAX-FUNDED ‘SEEP’ ENERGY-
EFFICIENCY PROGRAMMES
The above section suggests that an increase in household
energy efﬁciency delivers an economic stimulus and a
reduction in energy use, and is therefore a desirable policy.
However, problems may arise when the reallocation of gov-
ernment spending from certain areas to others has signiﬁ-
cant macroeconomic impacts, or is considered unacceptable
by the electorate. For this reason, this section focuses on the
impact of tax-funded energy-efﬁciency programmes, where
the spending to implement the increased energy efﬁciency
is additional to the current level of government spending.
We use SEEP as an example.
Table 2. Impact of a 5% increase in household energy efﬁciency under alternative ﬁscal regimes.
Time period
FIXGOV FIXBAL TAX
SR LR SR LR SR LR
Gross domestic product (GDP) 0.04 0.17 0.05 0.26 0.05 0.39
Consumer price index (CPI) 0.08 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.11 –0.08
Unemployment rate –0.24 0.00 –0.31 0.00 –0.34 0.00
Total employment 0.06 0.18 0.08 0.27 0.09 0.39
Nominal gross wage 0.11 0.00 0.14 0.00 0.12 –0.19
Nominal after tax wage 0.11 0.00 0.14 0.00 0.14 –0.08
Real gross wage 0.03 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.01 –0.11
Real after-tax wage 0.03 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.04 0.00
Household’s consumption 0.30 0.42 0.35 0.48 0.40 0.66
Investment 0.12 0.17 0.17 0.23 0.22 0.38
Exports –0.12 0.00 –0.14 0.00 –0.15 0.14
Non-energy output 0.07 0.19 0.09 0.27 0.09 0.39
Energy output –0.41 –0.41 –0.41 –0.37 –0.40 –0.22
Energy use –0.89 –0.57 –0.87 –0.51 –0.85 –0.36
Energy demand by industries –0.22 –0.24 –0.22 –0.19 –0.21 –0.03
Household’s energy consumption –2.70 –1.47 –2.65 –1.41 –2.60 –1.26
Government expenditure – – 0.06 0.24 – –
Fiscal deﬁcit –53.66 –165.48 – – – –
Income tax rate – – – – –0.10 –0.45
Economy-wide rebound 27.65 53.48 29.01 58.14 30.69 70.61
Note: SR, short run; LR, long run.
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How much efﬁciency do we need to make SEEP
a self-funded project?
SEEP is a 20-year programme in which the Scottish gov-
ernment commits to make an initial investment of £500
million in energy efﬁciency (Scottish Government,
2017).26 Pilots to assess the impact of such expenditure
on efﬁciency are still running, so it is currently not possible
to quantify this effect. Instead, we explore by how much
efﬁciency would have to increase in order to make the pro-
ject self-funding over its lifespan.
Using the model with ﬁxed government expenditure,
we calculate the discounted sum27 of government revenues
over 20 years from the introduction of the household
energy-efﬁciency improvements for energy efﬁciency
increases of 1–5%.
It is clear from Figure 2 that under current assumptions
that SEEP would break even with an increase in household
energy efﬁciency of approximately 2.5%; a SEEP project
that stimulates a 2.5% increase in household energy efﬁ-
ciency would be self-funding over 20 years.
Impact of a tax-ﬁnanced increase in household
energy efﬁciency
Assuming that SEEP does deliver the breakeven 2.5%
energy-efﬁciency stimulus, we assess the economy-wide
impact of such a project over its lifespan. This is set here
in circumstances where the initial spending of £500 million
is funded through an increase in the income tax rate.
We assume that the £500 million expenditure is
additional to the current level of government spending, G,
and that it is spread evenly over the ﬁrst ﬁve years of the pro-
ject. Given that we do not know which sectors directly
beneﬁt from this spending, we assume that in each year
the £100 million is distributed according to the govern-
ment’s initial shares of consumption from the data set, d
g
i .
This implies that, for years 1–5, expression (5) is replaced by:
FDt = GYt −GEXPt (5a)
GEXPt =
∑
i
Gi,t · Pgt +
∑
i
d
g
i 100m
+
∑
dngins
TRGdngins,t · Pct
Since both the ﬁscal deﬁcit and government expendi-
ture, G, are ﬁxed, government income needs to vary by
adjusting the income tax rate, t, to allow for the additional
spending. In year 6, equation (5a) is replaced by (5), the
income tax rate returns to its baseline value, the ﬁscal deﬁcit
is still constant and G is endogenously determined.
Table 3 summarizes key results for this scenario. We
focus on the ﬁrst and second columns – the period during
which the additional government spending takes place.
The additional spending of £100 million requires the
income tax rate to increase by 0.2%. This puts upward
pressure on the nominal wage through equation (3). In
the SR, the real gross wage increases by 0.08% while the
real after-tax wage is 0.03% higher.
The higher wage adversely impacts production. This
exacerbates the reduction in competitiveness caused by
the increased domestic demand. On the other hand, the
additional government spending further increases aggre-
gate demand. Overall, the stimulus from the increased
household energy efﬁciency and additional government
spending dominates the negative impact of the income
tax and GDP increases by 0.04% in the ﬁrst period and
0.06% in year 5. From year 6, the income tax rate returns
to the baseline value and ultimately the observed impacts
are purely driven by the permanent increase in household
energy efﬁciency.
Impact of a tax-ﬁnanced increase in household
energy efﬁciency with a ‘social wage’
We compare the above results with two alternative scen-
arios. The ﬁrst assumes a 2.5% increase in household
energy efﬁciency under ﬁscal autonomy where the ﬁscal
deﬁcit is held constant through endogenous adjustments
of government expenditure. Essentially, this replicates the
previous FIXBAL scenario, but for a 2.5% rather than a
5% increase in household energy efﬁciency, and assumes
that the implementation of the energy-efﬁciency improve-
ment is funded via a neutral reallocation of current govern-
ment spending. We refer to this as the SEEP-FIXBAL
case.
Second, we replicate the above analysis, but now assume
that the ‘social wage’ labour market closure is applicable.
This is implemented by setting a and b to unity in
equations (3a) and (4a). In this case, workers value the con-
sumption of additional public expenditure as much as their
private consumption; they are willing to accept lower real
wages in exchange for the beneﬁts of the increased energy
efﬁciency (including the reduction in energy use and in car-
bon emissions). We call this case SEEP (social wage).
The time path of GDP for each of the three cases is
plotted in Figure 3.28 First, compare the SEEP-FIXBAL
and SEEP cases. In the SEEP-FIXBAL case – the solid
line – GDP adjusts smoothly towards the LR, as neither
government expenditure nor aggregate demand are
impacted by the implementation phase. The SEEP case
outperforms the SEEP-FIXBAL case in the ﬁrst and
second years due to the additional government spending.
However, as the rise in the income tax rate increasingly
Figure 2. Discounted sum of government revenues over 20
years.
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impacts competitiveness, the GDP growth slows down
until period 5 where GDP is slightly higher in the
SEEP-FIXBAL case. From year 6 onwards, GDP starts
rising faster until it approaches the SEEP-FIXBAL case.
In the social wage case, the distortionary impact of the
increased income tax rate on the wage is neutralized by
workers’ (and migrants’) willingness to accept a lower
take-home pay to allow increased spending on energy efﬁ-
ciency. For this reason, from years 1 to 5, GDP is boosted
by the additional £100 million of public spending per year.
In year 6, the additional government spending is exhausted
and the proportionate increase in GDP is around 0.04%
lower than in year 5. However, it still remains above the
SEEP-FIXBAL and the SEEP cases. Note that here we
only report the adjustment path for 20 years, as this is
the lifespan of the energy-efﬁciency project. However,
the three cases converge to the same long-run equilibrium
subsequently, since ultimately this is driven solely by the
same permanent increase in household energy efﬁciency.
Between period 6 and the attainment of the long-run
equilibrium, the results reﬂect a combination of the perma-
nent stimulus to efﬁciency and the ‘legacy effects’ of transi-
tory changes in government spending and tax rate changes.
CONCLUSIONS
The results show that improving household energy efﬁ-
ciency does indeed have positive impacts on the host
regional economy, and such initiatives therefore have the
potential to be instruments of regional development policy
as well as climate change tools. Such initiatives are typically
associated with a double dividend of reduced energy use
and increased economic activity. However, the size of the
impact varies with the degree of regional ﬁscal autonomy,
the chosen method of ﬁnancing and the ‘tastes’ of the
host region’s population for ‘green’ policies, in terms of
their willingness to accept a reduction in the take-home
wage in exchange for government-funded increased energy
efﬁciency.29 While we use Scotland as an example, the
modelling results emulate a range of ﬁscal powers currently
possessed by regions of the UK and regions in other
countries.
When the increase in efﬁciency is funded via regional
government expenditure reallocation, differences in results
are driven by the speciﬁc ﬁscal regime of the region. Under
a block-grant-type ﬁscal regime, a 5% household energy
efﬁciency increase delivers a long-run rise in GDP of
0.17% with a reduction in total energy use of 0.57%.
Under ﬁscal autonomy, regional governments have the
power to recycle additional tax revenues either to increase
current spending or to reduce the income tax rate. If spend-
ing is increased, this further stimulates demand and delivers
Table 3. Impact of a 2.5% increase in household energy efﬁciency funded via an increase in the income tax rate.
Time period Short run (SR) 5 10 15 20 Long run (LR)
Gross domestic product (GDP) 0.04 0.06 0.09 0.11 0.12 0.13
Consumer price index (CPI) 0.08 0.06 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00
Unemployment rate –0.24 –0.10 –0.07 –0.04 –0.02 0.00
Total employment 0.06 0.09 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.14
Nominal gross wage 0.15 0.12 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.00
Nominal after-tax wage 0.10 0.07 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.00
Real gross wage 0.08 0.06 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
Real after-tax wage 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
Household consumption 0.13 0.16 0.22 0.23 0.24 0.25
Investment 0.05 0.06 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.12
Exports –0.10 –0.09 –0.03 –0.02 –0.01 0.00
Non-energy output 0.05 0.08 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.14
Energy output –0.13 –0.25 –0.23 –0.21 –0.20 –0.19
Energy use –0.24 –0.32 –0.29 –0.28 –0.27 –0.26
Energy demand by industries –0.06 –0.16 –0.13 –0.11 –0.10 –0.10
Household energy consumption –0.74 –0.77 –0.74 –0.73 –0.72 –0.71
Government expenditure 0.32 0.32 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12
Fiscal deﬁcit 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Income tax rate 0.20 0.21 – – – –
Figure 3. Time path adjustment of gross domestic product
(GDP) under different government budget assumptions.
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a long-run GDP increase of 0.26%, while total energy use
falls by 0.51%. When the additional tax revenues are used
to reduce the income tax rate, there is a supply-side
response because the real net-of-tax wage increases, but
the nominal wage falls. In this case, GDP increases by
0.39% in the long-run. However, total energy use falls by
only 0.36%. In all these cases the energy-efﬁciency
improvements are funded via current government spending
reallocation, which is assumed to leave aggregate demand
unaffected, and therefore the transitory change in govern-
ment demand has no impact on the results.
When an energy-efﬁciency programme (such as SEEP)
is ﬁnanced via an increased income tax rate, we have differ-
ent short- to medium-term impacts. In fact, income tax
variations have negative supply-side effects reﬂected in a
small loss of competitiveness. This is because at higher
tax rates workers put more upward pressure on wages,
thereby increasing the cost of producing goods in the
region. These impacts dominate the positive stimulus
from the additional government spending.
However, in the case where workers have ‘green’ tastes
and attribute the same marginal value to the government
programme and to private consumption, the distortionary
impact of the tax on competitiveness disappears. We then
observe positive transitory legacy impacts due to the
increase in government demand. This is because workers
are willing to accept lower wages in exchange for the
increased energy efﬁciency and associated reduced energy
use and emissions.
Overall, the analysis implies that regional governments
should consider household energy-efﬁciency-increasing
initiatives as potentially important instruments of regional
development policy, as well as of policies aimed at deliver-
ing energy (and emission) savings. Furthermore, the efﬁ-
cacy of household-efﬁciency enhancements in stimulating
economic development typically increases with the degree
of regional ﬁscal autonomy. However, this arises partially
at the expense of a corresponding decline in their efﬁcacy
as a source of energy savings. Future research should exam-
ine the nature of this trade-off for particular policy inter-
ventions in different regional cases. It should allow for
potentially differentiated impacts of changes in the compo-
sition of government expenditure on the aggregate econ-
omy and on any amenity value associated with them.
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NOTES
1. For example, in September 2016 the Scottish govern-
ment announced a post-European Union referendum
stimulus package that included, among other items,
additional spending on energy-efﬁciency measures (see
https://news.gov.scot/news/capital-spending-boost).
2. Rebound occurs when the potential energy savings
from an increase in energy efﬁciency are bigger than the
actual energy savings. This paper calculates the rebound
effect as: (1− (AES/PES))100, where AES is actual
energy savings; and PES is potential energy savings (for
details, see Figus, Lecca, McGregor, & Turner, 2017).
3. The Scottish government has recently designated
improved energy efﬁciency within homes and the non-
domestic building stock as part of the National Infrastruc-
ture Priority. This reﬂects an increasing awareness of the
role that energy efﬁciency might play in stimulating the
regional economy.
4. The double-dividend argument can be decomposed
into a number of multiple beneﬁts as intended by the Inter-
national Energy Agency (IEA) (2014).
5. The Welsh Assembly will have the power to set an
income tax rate from April 2019, and the Northern Ireland
Executive will be able to set the corporation tax rate from
April 2018.
6. Similar results are found in Figus, Turner, et al. (2017)
where the distributional impact of household energy-efﬁ-
ciency improvements is assessed.
7. Figus, Lecca, et al. (2017) show that if the CPI is
adjusted to reﬂect the price of energy in efﬁciency units,
there is actually an improvement in competitiveness.
8. AMOS is the acronym for a micro–macro model of
Scotland. ENVI indicates a version of this model devel-
oped for the analysis of energy/environmental impacts of
a range of policies and other disturbances.
9. Of course, the database of the model reﬂects the
characteristics of a regional economy: in particular, the
Scottish economy is highly open with respect to trade.
10. Figus, Lecca, et al. (2017) discuss the implications of
using different estimated elasticities.
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11. See Figure A2 in Appendix A in the supplemental
data online for a schematic representation of the pro-
duction structure.
12. Which is the same as that in equation (3).
13. While the 2009 national accounts may not fully reﬂect
the current economic situation in Scotland, evidence
suggests that economic structure changes little over com-
paratively short periods of time.
14. See Table B1 in Appendix B in the supplemental data
online for the full list of sectors included in the model.
15. This also allows a comparison of the results with the
UK case in Lecca, McGregor et al. (2014).
16. We could, in principle, capture any reallocation effects
if we had sufﬁcient data. For example, see Hermannsson
et al. (2013) on balanced expenditure multipliers applied
in a higher education institutions (HEIs) context.
17. We assume that general current public spending has
no supply-side impact effects.
18. We do not intend to provide an exhaustive analysis of
the impact of SEEP because: (1) SEEP focuses on both
residential and commercial energy-efﬁciency improve-
ments while we only focus on residential; and (2) although
the analysis uses a Scottish model, it aims to emulate the
likely impact of energy-efﬁciency programmes in regions
with similarly devolved ﬁscal powers.
19. Of course, policy efﬁcacy is concerned with much
more than ‘breaking even’ in public ﬁnance terms, and
should reﬂect the wider considerations we have already
emphasized, including impacts on the economy and energy
use.
20. Figus, Lecca, et al. (2017) show that if the CPI
used to deﬂate the real wage is adjusted to include the
price of energy in efﬁciency units, we observe an increase
in competitiveness due to the reduction in the nominal
wage.
21. In a comparable UK study by Lecca, McGregor et al.
(2014), GDP increases by 0.10%. However, the fall in total
energy use is correspondingly less in the Scottish case
(–0.57% as against –0.70% for the UK). This reﬂects the
structural differences between the UK and Scotland as cap-
tured by the models databases. We have isolated these by
examining the impact of the same shock in AMOS
ENVI under an assumption of zero labour mobility.
Unsurprisingly, Scottish trade ﬂows prove more sensitive
to competitiveness changes, but the migration effect is
much more important quantitatively. Space restrictions
preclude a detailed treatment, but this available in Figus,
Lecca, et al. (2017).
22. In an alternative scenario with no migration, we ﬁnd
that energy used by industries falls by 0.3% and household
energy consumption by 1.48%.
23. Again, this will not be the case if we use a quality-
adjusted CPI, as explained by Figus, Lecca, et al. (2017),
as there will be supply responses through the real wage.
24. For simplicity, we use the SR elasticity for the short
run and the LR elasticity for the long run.
25. The negative sign indicates that the deﬁcit has fallen.
26. Again, this includes energy-efﬁciency improvements
in residential and non-residential buildings. However,
here we focus on the impact of energy-efﬁciency improve-
ments only in residential energy use.
27. We use a discount factor of 3.5%, as recommended by
the Green Book of HM Treasury (2013).
28. We have run the same 2.5% increase in household
energy efﬁciency assuming a Barnett-type closure
(SEEP-FIXGOV). Results are compatible with those pre-
sented in Table 2, in that the more efﬁcient use of energy
delivers a positive but smaller increase in GDP (0.8% in
year 20) than the SEEP-FIXBAL case.
29. The size of these effects also varies with the degree of
openness of the host economy, as our earlier comparison
with the national results reported by Lecca, McGregor
et al. (2014) clearly indicates.
ORCID
Gioele Figus http://orcid.org/0000-0002-2642-5504
Patrizio Lecca http://orcid.org/0000-0002-1053-3869
Peter McGregor http://orcid.org/0000-0003-1221-7963
REFERENCES
Adams, P. D., & Higgs, P. J. (1990). Calibration of computable gen-
eral equilibrium models from synthetic benchmark equilibrium
data sets. Economic Record, 66(2), 110–126. doi:10.1111/j.1475-
4932.1990.tb01712.x
Allan, G., Hanley, N., McGregor, P., Swales, K., & Turner, K.
(2007). The impact of increased efﬁciency in the industrial use
of energy: A computable general equilibrium analysis for the
United Kingdom. Energy Economics, 29, 779–798. doi:10.1016/
j.eneco.2006.12.006
Armington, P. S. (1969). A theory of demand for products distin-
guished by place of production. Staff Papers – International
Monetary Fund, 16(1), 159–178. doi:10.2307/3866403
Blanchﬂower, D. G., & Oswald, A. J. (2009). The wage curve.
Europe. Revue Litteraire Mensuelle, 92, 215–235.
Broberg, T., Berg, C., & Samakovlis, E. (2015). The economy-wide
rebound effect from improved energy efﬁciency in Swedish indus-
tries: A general equilibrium analysis. Energy Policy, 83, 26–37.
doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2015.03.026
Duarte, R., Feng, K., Sanchez-Choliz, J., Sarasa, C., & Sun, L.
(2015). Modelling the carbon consequences of pro-environ-
mental consumer behaviour. Applied Energy, 16(1), 1207–1216.
Dufournaud, C. M., Quinn, J. T., & Harrington, J. J. (1994). An
applied general equilibrium (AGE) analysis of a policy designed
to reduce the household consumption of wood in the Sudan.
Resource and Energy Economics, 16, 67–90. doi:10.1016/0928-
7655(94)90014-0
Emonts-Holley, T., & Ross, A. (2014). Social accounting matrix for
Scotland (Working Paper). Glasgow: Fraser of Allander
Institute, Department of Economics, University of Strathclyde.
Figus, G., Lecca, P., McGregor, P., & Turner, K. (2017). Energy efﬁ-
ciency as an instrument of regional development policy? Trading-off
the beneﬁts of an economic stimulus and energy rebound effects
(Strathclyde Discussion Papers in Economics Vol. 17.02).
Glasgow: University of Strathclyde.
Figus, G., Turner, K., McGregor, P., & Katris, A. (2017). Making
the case for supporting broad energy efﬁciency programmes:
Impacts on household incomes and other economic beneﬁts.
Energy Policy, 111, 157–165. doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2017.09.028
Glomsrød, S., & Wei, T. (2005). Coal cleaning: A viable strategy for
reduced carbon emissions and improved environment in China?
Energy Policy, 33, 525–542. doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2003.08.019
10 Gioele Figus et al.
REGIONAL STUDIES
Grepperud, S., & Rasmussen, I. (2004). A general equilibrium
assessment of rebound effects. Energy Economics, 26, 261–282.
doi:10.1016/j.eneco.2003.11.003
Hayashi, F. (1982). Tobin’s marginal q and average q: A neoclassical
interpretation. Econometrica, 50(1), 213–224.
Hanley, N., McGregor, P. G., Swales, J. K., & Turner, K. (2009). Do
increases in energy efﬁciency improve environmental quality and
sustainability? Ecological Economics, 68, 692–709. doi:10.1016/j.
ecolecon.2008.06.004
Hermannsson, K., Lisenkova, K., McGregor, P., & Swales, J. K.
(2013). ‘Policy scepticism’ and the impact of Scottish higher
education institutions (HEIs) on their host region: Accounting
for a regional budget constraint under devolution. Regional
Studies, 48(2), 400–417.
HMTreasury. (2003). The green book. Appraisal and evaluation in cen-
tral Government. London: HM Treasury.
International Energy Agency (IEA). (2014). Capturing the multiple
beneﬁts of energy efﬁciency: A guide to quantifying the value added.
Paris: IEA.
Layard, R., Nickell, S., & Jackman, R. (1991). Unemployment:
Macroeconomic performance and the labour market. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Lecca, P., McGregor, P. G., Swales, J. K., & Turner, K. (2014). The
added value from a general equilibrium analysis of increased efﬁ-
ciency in household energy use. Ecological Economics, 100, 51–62.
doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2014.01.008
Lecca, P., McGregor, P., Swales, J. K., & Yin, Y. P. (2014). Balanced
budget multipliers for small open regions within a federal system:
Evidence from the Scottish variable rate of income tax. Journal of
Regional Science, 54, 402–421.
McGregor, P. G., Swales, J. K., & Yin, Y. P. (1996). A long-run
interpretation of regional input–output analysis. Journal of Regional
Science, 36(3), 479–501. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9787.1996.tb01113.x
Scottish Government. (2017). Scotland’s Energy Efﬁciency Programme
(SEEP). National infrastructure priority for energy efﬁciency.
Retrieved from http://www.gov.scot/Resource/0051/00513248.pdf
Turner, K. (2009). Negative rebound and disinvestment effects in
response to an improvement in energy efﬁciency in the UK econ-
omy. Energy Economics, 31, 648–666. doi:10.1016/j.eneco.2009.
01.008
Yu, X., Moreno-Cruz, J., & Crittenden, J. C. (2015). Regional energy
rebound effect: The impact of economy-wide and sector level
energy efﬁciency improvement in Georgia, USA. Energy Policy,
87, 250–259. doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2015.09.020
Energy efﬁciency as an instrument of regional development policy? The impact of regional ﬁscal autonomy 11
REGIONAL STUDIES
